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I 
If we look back upon the 19th century from our van-
tage point in time, and ask ourselves which of its 
great thinkers best comprehended his era, one figure 
stands before us: Nietzsche. Enough has been written 
on the insightful wisdom of this .man. Yet if we take 
"wisdom" to mean "the correct prediction of events," 
which is what it really means outside of traditional 
theology and philosophy in the wide-open arena of 
facts, then we will see that this man hit the mark in 
contrast to all the progress mongers of his day. Prac-
tical wisdom, Aristotle thought, is demonstrated by the 
one who si7.es up a situation and successfully foretells 
what will evolve out of it. Nietzsche told us he was 
more a prophet than a philosopher. 
This essay will elucidate just how successfully 
Nietzsche's words prefigured our century and how they 
must prefigure still some things to come. The secret 
of his revelations came not from a god speaking through 
him like an ancient oracle, although he was not aware 
of how accurate he was to be. It is strange that as a 
prophet, as a "philosopher of the future," to use his 
phrase, he was almost oblivious to the significance of 
the major economic and political movements in the 
1870's and 1880's—the birth of the German Reich; the 
challenge to colonial arrogance by Russian pressure in 
Kazakh, Constantinople, and the Balkans; the demise of 
French, English, and Austrian state diplomacy by the 
dictatorship of wages; the growth of New York City. 
Particulars like these, tremendous in their historical 
import, never came in clear focus. His literary train-
ing prevented him from feeling deep concern for current 
events. Nevertheless, an innate talent compensated for 
this deficiency. Unlike any philosopher of his day or, 
indeed, down through the ages, Nietzsche was a musi-
cian. He sensed naturally his immediate environment by 
its "tempo" or "rhythm." He could feel the pulse beat 
of this poem or that opera, this man or that woman, 
this school of thought or that doctrine, to the degree 
that he came to recognize the tune or melody of the age 
and compared it to those of former ages. In short, 
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Nietzsche detected in the movement of facts the Jiving 
form they took, saw where this form led before, and 
then prophesied where it would probably end. "Roneolo-
gy" was the final term he uned Cor this procedure. It 
was his way of stepping outside the basic values, as-
sumptions, and feelings of his own century. More spe-
cifically, he sensed first what was spiritually closo 
to him, the artistic forms of the late 19th century, 
e.g. the music of Wagner, Rizet, and Brahms; the poetry 
of Baudelaire, the Parisian novelists, Tolstoy, Dos-
toievsky; the plays of Ibsen. Then he sensed the same 
"life beat," the same impulses. In Hegelian socialism. 
Darwinian sociology, or the romantic pessimism of 
Schopenhauer. Finally he compared these impressions, 
these tunes of his age, with those he had of Homeric 
Greece, Renaissance Italy, or the Ancien Regime. "To 
look at the world through the eyes of an artist," as 
Nietzsche described this methodology in The Birth of 
Tragedy, has its limitations and drawbackn, but in the 
iBOO's it gave a completely different presentation to 
the small audience it reached. An altogether new 
prophetic philosophy of history was produced through an 
artistic flair. 
The actual beginning of this new approach «~ame 
through a personal crisis, one which many other sensi-
tive souls in the 19th century experienced: the incom-
patibility between artistic life and growing industri-
alization. Name whom you will among the figures of the 
time--Schi11er, Goethe, Balzac, Victor Hugo, Wagner, 
Liszt—all of them gave utterance to the disparity 
between their calling and megapolitan existence. But, 
again, Nietzsche stood apart from them. By a powerful 
Intuition he perceived in their romanticism, classi-
cism, realism, new realism, historiclsm, art for art's 
sake--he perceived in all their trends the same under-
lying beat which characterized alike the banker, the 
politician, the dreamy idealist, and the educated cit-
izenry. The artists--and I cannot think of one excep-
tion—were drawing their source of inspiration from the 
same elements which formulated the goals for the 
revolutionist, the positlvist, and the industrialist. 
All of them had one value in common, and we today are 
still linked to their era because we, in the Western 
cities, possess, despite ourselves, the same fundamen-
tal value. We all worship man. We are "humanists," 
whether we are fascists, communists, liberals, republi-
cans, administrators, students, born-again Christians, 
or just simply "welIwlshers." This value is a given of 
our daily routine. It even determines our dress and 
what we consider to be tasteful and mannerly. 
Nietzsche, being by nature an old-fashioned aristocrat, 
was very sensitive to all this. He was the first to 
suggest that the artistic "isms" had, as their spirit-
ual counterpart, what others have called "socialism" 
and "capitalism," whatever their connotations. This 
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new understanding came simultaneously with another 
insight: when an artist is a humanitarian, he can only 
create an art which has no future. There will always 
be myriad voices shouting down Nietzsche's claim that 
modern art is dead. But for those who refuse to let 
themselves be totally fooled, let them consider Nietz-
sche's argument: modernity is anti-artistic because 
great art is anti-humanistic, anti-ethical, anti-
social. Tills is why the priestly-minded Plato banished 
the poet from the perfect social order. Genuine art 
celebrates life, and not the good life; it celebrates 
existence, and not ordered existence; it exalts tragedy 
and not justice. Goethe said he could not write trag-
edy because his soul was "too conciliatory." So too 
the whole age. No matter how much poets like Words-
worth and Shelley were composing odes to peasantry and 
nature, and Byron giving his life to Greece, they were 
at one with the age of utilitarian progress when they 
assumed the highest value to be the good of mankind. 
Even those figures for whom Nietzsche felt an affinity 
could not escape entirely this world-sentiment--in 
music Beethoven and Chopin, in poetry Heine> in litera-
ture Stendahl and Dostoievsky—they represented the 
glowing sky after sunset. 1 
But prophetic wisdom takes the present as an inter-
lude. Nietzsche believed the religion of man first ap-
peared in the literature of Rousseau at the end of the 
18th century, when it eclipsed forever the world " that 
he once called die alte Zeit,"* the world before the 
French Revolution in which a great art was the manner 
of living for the upper aristocratic strata in Western-
bred nations. He considered his Thus Spake Zarathustra 
the first real pronouncement of its end. But just when 
this pronouncement would cease to be "untimely," when 
it would mirror the spirit of a new era--one which pro-
bably would never hear the, name of its author-
Nietzsche never clearly said. Would it be simultaneous 
with the disappearance of megapolitan existence, and 
thus outside the destiny of Western man? Would it oc-
cur somewhere within the still unlived time of the 
European humanity? For whom would it occur—Slavs, 
Germans, Americans? These questions floated before 
him, but he did not have the means to answer them. In 
all cases, Zarathustra spoke of a far-off distant 
future. More specific pronouncements eluded Nietzsche. 
His musical sense shied before the phenomena of great 
economic enterprises; before global imperialism; before 
armored ships, railways, and smoke stacks; before the 
will-to-power inside the Ruhr Gebiet. In many ways, 
his "over-view" was blocked by his nearness to poetry, 
music, and painting. It worked to the degree it did by 
his retreat to the south, to the museum of Italy. 
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the power of 
hi8 over-view, as he was aware himself, was to see 
beyond the individual arts and to take "art" in its 
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broader sense to mean "culture." Though he had high 
hopes for the emergence of a future artist who would 
have healthier Instincts than Wagner, Manet, and 
Baudelaire, 1 he had no difficulties in realizing that a 
truly artistic life in the style of the 17th century 
was over, that poetry and painting per se were only 
forms of something more important, that tragic great-
ness of the distant future did not depend on paint 
brushes and lyrics. 
With this in mind, let us examine first how the 
political events since Nietzshce's generation have ful-
filled his general predictions, and second, why the fu-
ture world situation has no room for our type of human-
ity. 
II 
Nietzsche's philosophy of art cannot be separated 
from his understanding of history and politics. They 
are the same. The past, die alte Zeit, developed both 
their art and their political form by rules and pre-
cepts which unconsciously guarded particular predilec-
tions from being brought under serious criticism. The 
painting schools of Renaissance Italy or the music 
styles between the 15th and 18th centuries in northern 
and southern Europe were concomitants of small aristo-
cratic states. Likewise the age of social betterment, 
the age of liberty, fraternity and equality, can wit-
ness its spirit both in representative government and 
in heroes and heroines of novels which invariably por-
tray the middle-class mentality of cosmopolitan life. 
The distant future, Nietzsche assured us, will find ar-
tistically and politically new boundaries that are in-
conceivable to us now because it will be a new begin-
ning, not one traversed before, not one evolving out of 
our time or out of the past. Every society that has 
experienced exhaustion and loss of direction is swept 
away by another society with another myth originating 
somewhere in the depths of nature, demanding a new 
style of living, believing, working, and perceiving. 
Granted Nietzsche was considerably vague about the 
details of this new world of the future, he was certain 
that the middle-class world of popular rule would be 
over the moment a founding myth began articulating it-
self. He wondered whence it would come.* He speculat-
ed about the results of a mixture between Russian and 
Germanic peoples, at one time speaking somewhat hope-
fully about it, at another as the greatest of dangers 
to the West. 8 
Exact prediction never characterized Nietzsche's 
genealogical thinking. Only general types, tendencies, 
and conditions of creativity can be ascertained: Fore-
most among the characteristics which he perceived in 
artists and statesmen during periods of cultural flow-
ering was a kind of "skepticism." To understand 
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Nietzsche rightly, we must divorce this term from any 
scientific meaning. In the end it has nothing to do 
with an intellectual judgment of decision, especially 
with the agnostic code of holding one morally reprehen-
sible for believing an unverifiable hypothesis. In 
fact, this 19th century "skepticism" is the exact oppo-
site of what Nietzsche had in mind when he spoke of 
Caesar, Leonardo, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Homer, 
Aristophanes, and Goethe as skeptics.' The productive 
moments of such figures never came by assuming a 
"standpoint." Scientific, ethical, ideological, and 
aesthetic judgments are always, as Nietzsche knew, the 
conclusions of a movement that is itself neither 
scientific, ethical, ideological, or aesthetic in form. 
A deed or a judgment which begins with a conclusion can 
only repeat the conclusion. Though a sense of security 
be attained thereby, it is achieved only to avoid a 
deeper indecisiveness. Nietzsche observed this kind of 
frightened skeptic embodied in the oldest of European 
states. France of the second half of his century--with 
its "objectiveness," its scientific spirit, 1_'art pour 
1'art, and pure voluntary knowledge—took its "^skepti-
cism" to be the only morally correct posture for man-
kind, whereas it really manifested paralysis of will. 7 
But whatever we may think of Nietzsche's observation of 
France, the point is clear: conclusive judgment is the 
freezing of will, while will is the movement directing 
all judgment. The kind of skepticism prevailing over 
creative individuals and eras is always prior to all 
decision, belonging to inclinations, not to reflec-
tions. It is given to a few, denied to most, to des-
pise the safety offered by another's work; to have the 
prejudice of believing nothing true, good, and beauti-
ful save what they alone create; to sacrifice peace, 
happiness, even life to fulfill what appears as a per-
sonal dream; to be blind, intolerant, or forgetful of 
any value or argument that denies this dream. 
Nietzsche believed that he alone perceived this 
hard skepticism of the will in the early Greeks. But 
he realized that Plato had sensed something of it as 
well. The exclusion of the artist from the perfect 
state indicates that this skeptical predisposition is 
the greatest adversary to "truth." Like Longinus, 
Nietzsche understood that great art or the great life 
arises out of a "dangerous" side of nature.* Artists--
not to speak of the unartistic—as a rule do not sense 
this quality in themselves, nor do they possess it to a 
significant degree. Yet the jumps in the history of 
painting, music, or architecture, just like the politi-
cal forms of the national state, consistently substan-
tiate that reality goes counter to our primitive wishes 
for stability, security, peace, permanence, steady pro-
gress, and justice. There have always been grounds for 
the argument that mathematics and the other sciences 
made their breakthroughs by the spontaneous joyful 
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thrust that knocks down the formulated walls of well-
established truths. Nietzsche, more than any other 
thinker in his century, demonstrated that all aspects 
of culture, from science to politics, operate artis-
tically. The first act of the intellect is a creating 
rather than a recording, which means man is agressive 
in his sense for the surrounding world, that his pri-
mary impulses will always conflict with those impulses 
beginning from a fearful consciousness, "reactions" to 
hostility and misfortune, impulses seeking flight from 
danger, security, rest, and other-worldly order.' When 
one finds the exceptional individual or people whose 
character is such that the natural urges to form and 
shape overcome those to escape or restructure, one has 
the embodiment of what Nietzsche called "masculine 
skepticism" or "Fredericanism. , , , , We read in Beyond 
Good and Evil that this type discovered in Nietzsche 1^ 
day a strange outlet in German philologists and histor-
ians, "all of them artists of destruction and dissolu-
tion, " for they were possessed by a "fearlessness of 
gaze," the sternness of character and courage that 
Michelet observed not without a shudder: "cet esprit 
fataliste, ironique, mephistophelique." , 1 Their style 
of working did not reflect the unquestioned truth of 
socialism and scientific progress in the manner that 
the works of Wagner, Delacroix, Ibsen, or Tolstoy did. 
As the 19th century artist came unawares to exist 
for scientific socialism—for Comte, Darwin, and 
Spencer--so the statesman came to exist for the in-
terests of the businessman. It was precisely because 
political policy served economic policy that Nietzsche 
lost sight and interest in what actually was to shape 
world history in his century and the next. He did not 
recognize that a specific form of socialism—Prussian 
Imperialism, Ecclesiastical Imperialism, or Anglo-Saxon 
Capitalism—would have to rule international Europe and 
later the world. 
Ill 
It was easy in Nietzsche's time to be skeptical to-
ward the new utilitarian principles of England, the 
tenets of any religious faith, the program of a govern-
ment of communards, or the aesthetic taste in Zola's 
new realism, but no one, save Nietzsche, could be skep-
tical to the point of doubting the value of critical 
inquiry. He alone challenged the age by denying that 
"truth" is the most important value of cultured life. 1* 
It is an unessential value to the old artist ard a fa-
tality to the new. And we can see today in retrospect 
that all theoreticians and pamphleteers between 1770 
and 1870, the only period in which principles of 
knowledge could influence state policy, were in the end 
ineffective in determining what actual type of social-
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ism was to be, when and where it would originate. All 
this was finally decided by fighting two world wars. 
But the bourgeoisie sustains itself by being criti-
cal. Its work, mission, and structure is critical. 
The streets, buildings, and industries of any city in 
Europe or America are faithful images of its mind. Its 
great talent can be summed up in one word, "organiza-
tion." Yet this means it is not "creative" in the 
sense in which Nietzsche used this word. It cannot 
prolong any great art. This is difficult, nay impossi-
ble, for a man of the big city to grasp, since art sur-
rounds and bewitches him all day long. He is not capa-
ble of distinguishing between forming and structuring. 
This was the case in the last century as it is now. 
Despite Nietzsche's small contact with the industrial 
cities, he understood their spirit and purpose. It was 
the fine artist who said: "0 Zarathustra, everything 
is a lie in me; but that I collapse'—this my collapsing 
is genuine!" 1 1 The artist of the Parisian attic or 
German spas could still enchant his society, but in do-
ing so he became disenchanted with himself. 1* In 
short, it is not the pragmatic materialism of a plebian 
order that corrupted the poet and painter. They them-
selves lacked the energy to throw off the other-worldly 
spells of the clergyman, the philosopher, the scholar, 
and the idealist, and to offer a direction for the rest 
of society. They were Platonic, or to use Nietzsche's 
word, they became "priestly" in order to cope with the 
drive to mechanical organization. 
There is a parallel between the disappearance of 
the great artist of tradition and that of the old-style 
statesman like Frederick the Great or Metternich and 
the emergence of men like Bismarck, Napoleon III, and 
Disraeli, but it is not an exact one. Wagnerian opera 
demonstrated to Nietzsche that a fine art may carry on 
a superficial existence by becoming priestly or prag-
matic, or a little of both. But a state in Europe 
could never be priestly at bottom. It never has been. 
Nietzsche understood that every church or sect that en-
tered the race for survival had done so by imitating 
the prevalent state forms of the time. He always in-
sisted that it was not in the idea of any clergy to 
create: it must imitate to endure. 1* In the end, its 
aim is to destroy res mundi through a pessimism so deep 
as to be unfathomable to the bourgeoisie, nobility, or 
any other order or class of a society. Idealists, phi-
losophers, poets, and scholars have shared from time 
immemorial this melancholy spirit that yearns for eter-
nal truth above all things. 1* The 19th century, how-
ever, may still prove to be their greatest period of 
political influence. Outside Nietzsche, Dostoievsky 
appears to be the only one to percieve that the French 
socialistic theories of Saint-Simon, Comte, and Proud-
hon were so many variations on the older, actual poli-
cies of Jesuitical Rome, theories postulating "justice" 
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through the collapse of all states, traditions and 
local habits—all this for the "good of everyone" with-
out regard to class, rank, and nation. 1 7 Again, in 
retrospect, it is possible to understand now that 
Ecclesiastical Socialism was taken up into the ambi-
tions of the Hapsburgs and became a reality in the 
creation of Latin America. Its final chance foi* re-
emergence in France was lost towards the end of the 
19th century when the republican party overcame the 
last of the royalists. Capitalistic socialism of En-
gland and America, on the other hand, became a reality 
by respecting in theory "Liberty, Equality, Brother-
hood," but disregarding the motto in practice. When-
ever a political dream is the product of the critical 
Intellect, it is "priestly," no matter how atheistic or 
anti-clerical it appears, and therefore, it is always 
impractical and nihilistic. " 
The point is this: the new reign of the middle 
class destroyed by means of finance capital and indus-
trialization the fine arts and politic of unconscious 
tradition, and there appeared in their place a pseudo-
art of pessimistic, irreligious priesterdom, which is 
the death of art, and a politic that uses the same pes-
simism for the ends of national or private economy, 
which is flat materialism. This was the framework of 
Nietzsche's world, and the reason he estranged himself 
from it. He understood what no one else understood, 
namely the "third estate" can never experience great-
n e s s — " . . . great misfortune, great ugliness, great 
failure . . .""—greatness in any respect, despite the 
putting on of airs, the imitating of aristocratic bear-
ing. If the popular mentality could not see the ob-
vious superiority of Handel, Bach, and Mozart over Wag-
ner and Brahms, it was going to misinterpret the phi-
losophy of self-surpassing. 
Nevertheless, Nietzsche overcame cynicism and dis-
gust for his age in his long masterpiece. Not all was 
hopeless. 1789 and the growth of the corporate world 
of London, Hamburg, and Paris were the ground from 
which the "anachronism" of the century sprang. 1 0 Napo-
leon I had come to power on the principles of modern 
economy and representative government, and he fell by 
the same. The Corsican was the first symbol of a phe-
nomenon that has repeated itself, in less and less 
Romantic color, in more and more circumspect ways, 
through two centuries of European and American history. 
How often has "Republicanism" fostered "Imperialism," 
then opposed it? Even Nietzsche, in voluntary exile 
and with no concern for contemporary politics, must 
have been at least dimly aware of the new situation. 
The conflict between the interests of economy and in-
terests of politics did not suddenly begin in recent 
decades.** The 19th century observed the West European 
nations converting the old monarchial and aristocratic 
state of previous centuries into an organ operating es-
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sentially in behalf of private income, but as soon as 
any leading government carried out policies toward 
other states, it would inevitably reveal intentions 
contrary to "free enterprise," intentions that, when 
fulfilled, would make all economic problems secondary 
to the existence of an imperial state. In short, the 
structure of modern economy begs the existence of im-
perial politics, but it continually dismantles the im-
perial state for maximization of profit. The battle 
between economics and politics, business and govern-
ment, capitalistic socialism and imperialistic social-
ism, has already been fought between nations and within 
nations, Western and non-Western. It should be evident 
to us in the late 20th century that the defeat of 
Germany in the two world wars was the defeat of mili-
tary or Prussian-style socialism, and the victory of 
the Western Allies meant the continuation of Anglo-
Saxon international-capitalism. 
IV 
It is interesting that Nietzsche predicted the 
first of the world wars. 1 2 Yet his mind could not 
dwell too long on the mounting crisis. He continued to 
look upon things from another perspective, another age, 
either through the past or future. Rather than states, 
he concentrated on individuals, not Bismarck or Wilhelm 
I but on individuals as types. It still seems strange 
to us to read that it was not something like the "Ang-
licising" of the continent that threatened Europe's 
future, but the priest; not the surge of Communism in 
Paris, but Christian pity. We still have not grasped 
the implications of the genealogical argument. When 
Nietzsche looked at Wagner's audience in Bayreuth, he 
saw neither the past nor the future of a lasting man-
kind, only the bad taste of modernity, of an upper mid-
dle class organizing financial security for individual 
"egos," for small-minded, small-ranging, separate at-
oms, not for a type, for a universal form like the 
Prussian Adel, French Noblisse, or Jesuit society of 
priests and conquistadors. The new materialism showed 
one positive sign to Nietzsche, namely the growth of 
atheism, or the possible weakening of the priestly 
man's stranglehold over the 19th century. But the mid-
dle class is, in its way, like a simple peasantry, in 
that it is drawn into and shaped by two opposing prin-
ciples. Despite newspapers and all the noise of tech-
nology, history is a struggle between the other-worldly 
"nay" and this worldly "yea." Even though the best re-
presentatives of the two, the nobleman and the priest 
of feudal society, no longer figure in contemporary 
events, the conflict itself takes on a different ap-
pearance, thereby deceiving forever the eye of most 
historians. The soldier, businessman, and the worker, 
just like the barbaric woodsman, peasant, and nomad, 
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are the "human, all-to-human" matter for the battle be-
tween earth and heaven. 
Nietzsche's philosophy of history is yet to be ap-
preciated because the power of the priest is always in-
correctly gauged, particularly in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, and because the counter-force, "the super-
man," is completely misunderstood by a middle-class 
vision of things. 
Once and for all, the superman is an Urphanomen, a 
primal image to be sensed only through a comparison of 
classes, professions, orders, nationalities, epochs, 
even of its antithetical form, the priest. But it ap-
pears that Nietzsche intuited this primal type most of-
ten and most clearly in the artist. No artist has ever 
been superhuman, yet fine art at its best has the su-
perhuman in it, and Nietzsche expressed what it was 
when he said: "In art the end does not justify the 
means, but holy means can justify the end." 1 1 Whereas 
the pure statesman, politician, soldier, merchant, and 
technician orient their work around a successful fu-
ture, and whereas the priest, saint, philosopher, and 
theoretician contemplate other possible worlds, truths, 
or eternal laws--the artist encounters the world as it 
is in the present. His task is not "world-betterment" 
or revelation of a greater reality beyond sense experi-
ence. A drama by Aeschylus or a painting by Van Dyck 
or Raphael (but not Delacroix) came not from a need to 
make an important statement, to convey knowledge, or to 
communicate. 2* In fact, fine art emanates out of im-
pulses seeking to overcome pragmatic or priestly 
values." The artist of "die alte Zeit" was neither a 
man of action nor a thinker. Insofar as every great 
art work is a "thanksgiving" and a "benediction," as 
Nietzsche said, it served an utilitarian function, that 
of stimulating the zest for life. 1' This end is at-
tainable only by "holy means," that is, by the present 
world, just as it is, apart from a plan to reformulate 
it or to escape from it. Reverence and awe for the 
sensuous moment is a feeling that neither the pure man 
of fact nor of theory can comprehend. 
But to intuit the superman type in the activity of 
art is to sense "art" in its broadest meaning, to take 
it to be almost synonymous with "creativity" or "cul-
ture." When any work, including that of the churchman, 
becomes a celebration, it loses the spirit of "world-
denunciation" or of "world-improvement," both being at 
bottom the same. This means that culture, as histori-
cal development, is anti-pragmatic and anti-clerical. 
Though we know Nietzsche had personal limitations 
concerning natural philosophy and mathematics, he real-
ized they, like the European national states, were all 
works of art, works of love. Albert Camus observed 
that totalitarian governments react negatively towards 
art for the same reason Plato did: art, at its best, 
denies that social order is the highest value; culture 
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in general undermines order as the vital element of 
life." The very existence of grand art is a denial of 
any totalitarian order or any democratic order. All 
forms of modern government are opposed to the tragic 
sense for things. How wrong Sartre was when he said 
that creativity depended upon democratic freedom!** 
Creativity is not "humanistic," but "superhuman!stic," 
which means it is beyond good and evil, beyond all ide-
ology, all scientific organization of life, all pro-
graming. 
"Art," for a Nietzschean reader, is an affirmation 
of the "consequenceless" nature of things. When one 
celebrates the moment, the unconscious side of exist-
ence plays with present impressions, and makes of the 
art an expression not of individual consciousness, but 
of unconscious nature in the individual. How ridic-
ulous for poets to equate Beauty and Truth! The former 
is always sensuous and excites the cosmic will; the 
latter is intellectual, and as Nietzsche put it, "'The 
Will to Truth' is the will to impotence." 1' 
V 
No philosophy was ever as untimely as Nietzsche's. 
Who in 1890 was going to find "art" and the love of 
beauty as something altogether different than the taste 
of effeminate, dreamy natures? Who today will? Who 
can perceive culture as "Frederician skepticism"? But 
again, as Nietzsche argued, the downfall of Western man 
is not a problem of his perception or understanding, 
but a defect in his character, in his being—in his be-
ing too "responsive," too much driven to seize the 
image projected by the warning signs of the nervous 
system.'* Nobility presupposes a disposition ruled 
primarily by the primitive demands of "blood." 1 1 Zara-
thustra says, "Where is beauty? Where I must will with 
my whole Will; where I will love and perish, that an 
image may not remain merely an image." 1* The antece-
dents of cosmopolitanism cannot allow a present-day man 
to realize these words of Zarathustra, this noble 
disposition. He has forfeited to the needs of stabil-
ity and security, to the defense of life, the will to 
love the "innocence of Becoming," bellum omnis contra 
omnem, beyond good and evil. To most, whatever era and 
rank, fate is cruel, but the modern temperament cannot 
ennoble its suffering. It is compelled to denounce in 
practice and theory, by religion and science, suffering 
as evil. Technology, the city, the church—are all ef-
forts to avoid fate. The basic assumption of present 
global civilization is that consummate strength must 
work to freeze the natural transformation of all 
things, to halt, even to kill fate itself by organiza-
tion, whereas Nietzsche demonstrated this assumption as 
the unequivocal sign of fear, of advancing senility, 
and a general weakening of our nature, of our will to 
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power. A sound constitution does not behave too 
"defensively" or "responsively," or what amounts to the 
same in our age, as though existence were evil and 
unjust. It is not impelled to make thinking, living, 
and history into a program. Achaean Greece was ever 
for Nietzsche the counter image of modernity. With the 
energy of wild youth, the Greek heroines and heroes, 
legendary saints and prophets, blindly reached out to 
meet fate, but without the cynicism and spirit of 
revenge sometimes associated with youth. On every oc-
casion, they met events without care about tomorrow, 
about "life for the sake of life," though they them-
selves were, without knowledge and truth, the real 
future. It manifested that beauty which lived and died 
for an image created by the body, not by the imagina-
tion of an intellect, not by the electricity at nerve 
endings. A young will can overcome fear, which is 
waking-consciousness, and direct the nervous system to 
realize myth, regardless of consequence. This mode of 
living, what Heidegger once called "raging art," is 
courage. Zarathustra says to his guests at the cave, 
"For Fear—is an exception with us. Courage, however, 
and adventure, and delight in the uncertain, in the 
unattempted—courage seemeth to me the entire primitive 
history of man."" Beauty is the "Amor Fati." There-
fore, it is not the Truth or the Good: it is not what 
we can consciously make of them, but what our living 
unconscious nature makes of us. This is why Nietzsche 
found tragedy to be more profound than philosophy. The 
courage to throw life away from an overabundance of 
strength, for an image to become a reality, is both the 
characteristic of any form of greatness and the epitomy 
of the "consequenceless" flow of reality. The sublime 
sense of life sounded hopelessly ridiculous to Nietz-
sche's contemporaries. Hence, modern literature and 
clothes, even the manner in which symphonies were per-
formed, filled Nietzsche with contempt. 
Although considerably blurry, Nietzsche's untimely 
predictions are much more realistic than one shall ever 
meet in the works of Comte, Fourier, and Marx. We can 
count on the disappearance of our type of man, and with 
him the middle-class perspective which has governed the 
West since the Enlightenment. But it will not, how-
ever, be replaced with a higher stage of "culture," 
notwithstanding all the fictions imagined over the last 
two centuries. The end of the 20th century is like the 
end of the 19th in that the same fire is consuming us 
as it was Nietzsche's contemporaries; the same fire is 
segregating us from the past and the future. In fact, 
the meaning and the task of our civilization are both 
the breaking away from the work and traditions of the 
past and the preventing of any future idea from flower-
ing. Of course, we do hot see it the way Nietzsche did. 
We believe our whole effort is trying to save mankind 
from the evils of the past for the good of the future. 
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This has been the mandate of every political party 
since the French Revolution. We call it "progress" or 
"development." But nothing is more absurd as to think 
the present interlude is a step forward, in actuality 
or in intention. What good humanitarians are saving is 
nothing but an image of themselves which they call 
"mankind." "Humanism," "scientific progress," "econom-
ic development"—these catchy words imply that as long 
as we understand the tribulations of man, love culture 
and history, admire what "man" has achieved in the 
struggle for betterment, as long as we keep up the same 
fight, we cannot expect better of ourselves. The con-
trary is the case. The worship of man is nihilistic. 
Dostoievsky realized that our brand of humanism will 
finally exhaust the West through the democratic ten-
dency of trying to keep satisfied the lower and middle 
classes.** Other nations outside the circuit of our 
society do not have to contend with this "man-
religion." They are basically content. 
It is hard to imagine a world devoid of middle-
class cosmopolitanism. But we can overcome the diffi-
culty if we make the same effort Nietzsche did; if we 
perceive what he meant by the "superman" type, we will 
have some idea of the distant future. In the final 
part of Zarathustra, the prophet teaches his guests, 
the higher men—the kings, the pope, the magician, the 
soothsayer, and the rest—without word, with personal 
example and demonstration, to laugh while dancing. 
What does this scene mean? The future man will be like 
the man of "die alte Zeit" in that he will not perceive 
by ratiocination. He will not abstract reality and 
take the abstraction as reality. Wars, societies, and 
events will be shaped in some way other than by meter 
sticks and "bodies in perpetual motion." Our age—the 
19th, the 20th, and perhaps the 21st centuries—could 
possibly be the most artificial age ever to have been. 
Yet, when the destiny of mind over matter, reason over 
instinct, has fulfilled itself, another destiny will 
replace our mode of existence, and whatever the local-
ity or blood stream from which it will issue, it will 
be more lasting, more basic, one that will prove to be 
more of the norm in the flow of the entire history of 
man, not just of the West. The cosmopolitan type is an 
exception, not the rule—and the future, therefore, 
will be in this respect a return to the primitive 
Urphanomen that has prevailed in the great stretches of 
world history. Laughter and dance together are moments 
when the body overcomes the brain, the beat of blood 
the detached perception of things, moments that are the 
Urphanomen, the superman type. When Zarathustra per-
formed his wild, ecstatic dance, he evoked in those 
present a joy of the moment, the world as it is here 
and now, at high noon and midnight, untouched by the 
anxiety of learned men. The future man will not ex-
perience a higher stage of artistic culture by either 
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present or past measurements, but he will be, whether 
barbaric or highly civilized, more "artistic" in the 
deeper sense Nietzsche took the word. A man whose soul 
is not defeated by misfortune is one who realizes in 
the health of his body the joy that is deeper than all 
w o e . " Art is the only genuine metaphysical activity, 
Nietzsche declared to Wagner, 1' and the only genuine 
art is a joyful activity of the body. Dancing, compos-
ing, painting, or thinking—in contrast to the dance, 
the poem, the painting-as topic of analysis, or the 
thought of a system—is a "becoming," and as Goethe 
said, "unaussprechlich," unspeakable, comprehended not 
by causal formulation. But all creativity, human and 
cosmic, in war and peace, is a becoming, and is un-
speakable, comprehended by no word, only by the deep 
joy that is no monkish thing-in-itself, no Schopenhaur-
ian will. Laughter, said Zarathustra, kills every ar-
gument: it is the real living will dispelling the 
phantom called "truth." The future, no doubt, will 
still hold its religious observance, 1 1 for the same 
reason Zarathustra's guests, after their nightly rev-
elry, prepared to master, like every dumb plant and 
creeping animal, their own worlds. They must prepare, 
not out of fear for survival, out of egoism per se, but 
out of a love, a will, that will always surpass the 
stage of fearful existence. The superman's mastery of 
the conditions of his own existence, therefore, will 
not be another form of imperialism, but the Homeric 
ethic bearing victory or defeat as opportunity of un-
conscious nature to create its own order. 
Indeed, all this talk about the "future man" sounds 
foolish and childish. To us, to our age, it has to 
sound foolish and childish, just as it sounded to the 
Egyptian priest that Plato admired: "0 Solon, Solon, 
you Hellenes are never anything but children, and there 
is not an old man among you."*' But it sounds so be-
cause we, like the Egyptian priest, cannot love this 
world; we have no longer any star in front of us. A 
purely humanistic, cold, practical intelligence can 
only reflect the dreams of other ages and people. To 
present cultural leaders, Zarathustra says: "All peri-
ods prate against one another in your spirits; and the 
dreams and pratings of all periods were even realer 
than your awakeness!" ,* For all its innovation, our 
age is elderly and unable to have its own dream: 
"Unfruitful are ye: therefore do ye lack belief. But 
he who had to create, had always his presaging dreams 
and astral premonitions . . . ."*• Nevertheless, inso-
far as each of us experiences in our daily routine the 
joy of a moment, purely and clearly, without cynicism, 
do we foretell unawares something of a future type. 
Though we, like the higher men at Zarathustra's cave, 
are not the future, the currents of the future are in 
us, and we are, despite ourselves, bridges to another 
age and a world which will never know the pragmatic 
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nature possessing us. What will survive us—hard as it 
is to believe--is nothing of our serious intentions, 
nothing of our man-religion, our democratic socialism, 
our liberalism, our capitalism, nor the growing disil-
lusionment and world-wide nihilistic attitude toward 
these serious intentions, which were also born at the 
end of the 18th century. The moments in which we 
forget our late idealism or "get-tough" realism, we, 
even we, become "artistic" in Nietzsche's sense and ex-
perience something also of "die alte Zeit" before the 
dawn of industrialization. When we laugh from dancing, 
the rhythm of nature wills anew an untimely 
disposition. Gaiety, which is the eternity of nature 
for Nietzsche, will continually break the crust of 
Western utilitarianism, and will filter down to new 
generations, gathering momentum with the passage of 
time; while the serious business of world-organization 
will become progressively felt as impossible, and the 
greatness we sense therein will have disappeared with 
it. This future will take a form seen before: a new 
era blossoms when a generation is reached that ap-
proaches everything—war, building, thinking—by play-
ing. The blindness and naivety in the worlds of the 
early Greeks or Gothic knight are evident in their sur-
viving remnants of our museums. New creators are chil-
dren and have no choice but to play out their dreams. 
Therefore the children of the future, the supermen, 
will inherit nothing of our ponderous work or our cyni-
cism, but like all other children of history, on the 
"wheel of recurrence," they will be vibrant in the 
necessities of survival because they are made by nature 
to be forgetful of danger, to be daring and foolish, to 
be more artful than dutiful, to look for unexpected ac-
cidents everywhere, to be unconsciously grateful for 
things just as they are, and therefore to worship the 
earth by instinct. The children of tomorrow can only 
inherit what may happen to add to the "Gaiety transfi-
guring all that dread."* 1 Being controlled by nature, 
the child is possessed by the wisdom of instincts, 
which easily disregards the reasoning, yet accepts the 
rhythm in the nine steps of its forefathers so as to be 
able to take the tenth with the same rhythm. Thus the 
Nietzschean ethic to each higher man: "Thou must yet 
become a child, and be without shame."* 2 But Zara-
thustra could not, even though "in the true man there 
is a child hidden: it wanteth to play."* 1 Too much has 
been destroyed in the age of progress; the music, the 
dynastic state can never be restored, nor the activity 
that created them. This is why Nietzsche stumbled when 
it came to trying to figure out how one could set up 
again the conditions for the future man. It would be 
another program, hence futile. It would be the same 
sort of vanity Nietzsche noticed in the typical artist: 
the enforcement and hording of a little life by simple-
minded calculation.** As he said, Achilles would not 
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have been a Homer.* 5 The pope, the kings, the sooth-
sayer, and all others seeking solace at Zarathustra's 
cave must find it in the "future return," which is an 
"eternal return." The spinning of eternity is a joyful 
will: a joyful will alone survives time and death. 
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